Introduction
Of all the requisites necessary for sustainable development, peace is without doubt the most fundamental. In its absence it would be illusive to expect an improvement in the human condition.
Currently, however, the developing world is replete with civil conflicts and political instability According to the records of the International Institute of Strategic Studies there are some thirty major armed conflicts around the world, the vast majority taking place in the developing world (IISS 2000) . Armed conflict interrupts the process of development (Fitzgerald 1999;  Stewart and O'Sullivan 1999; Tansey et al. 1993) ; it destroys infrastructure and communities, disrupts economic activity, uproots populations, undermines social capital and leads to the impoverishment and marginalisation of its victims. Confounded in their efforts to promote development and deliver humanitarian assistance, donor agencies have begun tentatively to address the complex relationship between conflict, security and development (DFID 2000; Annan 1998 ; OECD DAC 1998).
The growing consensus on the need to address security as a development issue was reflected in, and reinforced by, the adoption of the Security First initiative in Mali. In 1994 a United Nations Advisory Mission to Mali concluded that the lack of capacity of the police, gendarmerie, national guard and border guards to control smuggling and banditry was blocking both the implementation of the peace accord and economic and social development. The Mission proposed a 'Security First' approach under which aid for development and the re-integration of ex-combatants was integrated with assistance to improve policing and border controls. The initial success of the Mali experiment stimulated the adoption of other initiatives modelled on the 'security first' philosophy, such as the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Cooperation in West Africa (PCASED). So far, however, 'security first' programmes have only met with limited success in terms of enhancing security and stability in conflict-burdened regions.
The 'security first' approach represents an important step in mainstreaming security in development, but it fails to address the deeper structural problems that lie at the heart of conflicts in the developing world. Theories of how and why violent protracted conflict occurs generally distinguish between structural factors on the one hand and accelerating, or triggering factors on the other (Azar 1990; Azar 1999; Galtung 1976) .
Structural factors, which must be viewed as long term, include interconnected political, social and economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic human needs, population pressure, distributional injustice, the depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions. Accelerating or triggering factors, on the other hand, operate in the context of the above adverse structural factors, but involve specific events, attitudes or decisions, which provoke or encourage violence. Such factors may include the abuse of political and military power, the proliferation of small arms, ideological conflict and struggles to exert control over natural resources.
Currently much of the international donor communities' efforts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping focus on policies that prioritise mediation between adversaries, ceasefires, microdisarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration of ex-combatants, security sector reform and the overseeing of free and fair elections. While these are important elements to any programme that is tasked with establishing peace and stability, they tend to focus on the triggering rather than structural causes of conflict.
This article argues that one of the major structural causes of current patterns of violence and conflict is to be found in the general failure of neoliberal policies underpinning the current phase of globalisation, to deliver more equitable patterns of development to large parts of the world. While globalisation has enhanced the wealth of the already rich and powerful (both states and people), it has simultaneously impoverished and marginalised many economies and peoples on the periphery of the global economy Widening socio-economic polarisation exacerbates social, political, cultural and ethnic tensions and contributes to growing levels of social unrest and conflict, particularly in the least developed countries (LDCs).
In many situations where the inclusion in formal economic activity has been closed off -either 36 because of economic collapse, debt crises, economic marginalisation or social disarticulationthere has been a notable emergence of cultures of violence predicated on patterns of primitive accumulation, reflected in the rise of organised crime andlor non-state military actors intent on controlling natural resources (Berdal and Malone 2000) . Analysts such as Collier (2000) argue that greed primarily motivates the warlords and criminal elements that utilise violence and undermine security in many parts of the developing world and transition economies of the former Soviet Union, but, as this article attempts to argue, social, economic and political marginalisation represent equally strong motives for taking up arms.
In elaborating upon these issues the first section of this article briefly explores the changing global order and the role that neoliberal policies have played in global restructuring. The second part explores the relationship between globalisation and economic insecurity, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of conflicts in the developing world occur. The third section explores the relationship between debt and poverty
The fourth discusses the relationship between poverty and conflict. The fifth section looks at the new forms of conflict and how they are structured, influenced and incorporated by the forces of globalisation, and the final section proposes an alternative approach to enhance security and development. (Manzo 1998 and a return to anarchy -a Hobbesian state of nature in which order and rationality are suspended (Kaplan 1994) . Rarely, if ever, has there been introspection, in which the fallibilities and mythologies of the dominant liberal discourse about peace and stability have been subjected to rigorous scrutiny, let alone a recognition that shock therapy, rapid market liberalisation and onerous structural adjustment programmes might be part of the security problem rather than the solution.
The Global Order/Disorder

Globalisation and Economic Insecurity
The neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation have without doubt contributed to a growth in world output and increased global volumes of trade and capital mobility; but mounting evidence also suggests that globalisation has resulted in increased economic volatïlity that undermines the basic economic security of many millions of people and contributes to a severe fissure between the 'winners and the losers' in unfettered global markets (UNCTAD 2000; UNDP 1999).
The losers include some 1.3 billion people in eightynine developing countries who are worse of now than they were ten to fifteen years ago. The neoliberal idea that somehow the benefits of global economic growth will 'trickle down' to the world poor, has been challenged by the stark reality of the experience in the world poorest societies. Some sobering UNDP figures summarised the balance of poverty, at the end of the twentieth century (UNDP 1997):
More than a quarter of the developing world peoples still live in poverty as measured by the UNDP human poverty index (HPI). About a third of total global population, 1.3 billion, live on incomes of less than $1 a day Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of people in poverty Some 220 million people, half the population of the continent, live in poverty, and the proportion is rising.
Eastern Europe and the countries of the While the ratio of trade to gross domestic product for the world has been rising over the past decade, in the fourty-four LDCs' whose populations total more than a billion people, the ratio of trade to economic output has in fact deteriorated since the 
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The LDCs' economic future looks bleak. Those countries whose real GDP per capita income has been in decline or was stagnant during the period 1990-98, 'can be expected to become caught in a situation in which economic regress, social stress and political instability interact in a vicious circle' (UNCTAD 2000) . Even for those LDCs whose economies are growing, there will be an ever-present danger that external shocks, natural disasters or negative spillover effects from neighbouring LDCs will disrupt economic activity, throw their fragile growth trajectories and cast them into a spiral of economic decline, instability and conflict.
Debt and the Poverty Trap
The protracted deterioration in terms of trade experienced by the majority of low-income countries has led to foreign currency deficits and high levels of indebtedness. Por instance, at the beginning of 1998 the total external debt of subSaharan Africa was estimated to be $328.9 billion, of which approximately 45 per cent was owed to official bilateral sources, 30 per cent to official multilateral sources, and 25 per cent to commercial lenders. To service this debt fully, African countries would have to pay more than 60 per cent or $86.3 billion of the $142.3 billion in revenues generated from their exports. In fact African countries as a whole paid more than 17 per cent of their total export earnings to donors and commercial lenders, leaving a total of $60.9 billion in unpaid accumulated arrears.
For almost two decades unsustainable debt has undermined human development in many of the world poorest countries. It remains a profound threat to the efforts of heavily ïndebted poor countries (HIPCs) to achieve the international development targets set for the year 2015. Moreover, as Kofi Annan has noted, the failure to meet basic needs due to the debt burden in no small measure contributes to the level of tension and conflict on the African continent (Annan 1998, Section 93) .
While Africa cannot avoid its share of responsibility for the present debt predicament, the international community needs to acknowledge its own role in creating and perpetuating the debt problem. More precisely, it needs to recognise the ways in which the current macro-economic stabilisation programmes used by the international community to address the debt crises undermine human development and contribute to the growing levels of human insecurity and conflict on the African continent.
The international community deals with indebtedness through the IMF's enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF). Under the terms of IMP conditionality, indebted countries must undergo a package of economic reforms, which invariably involve the following elements:
A reduction in government expenditure, by making public-sector redundancies, freezing salaries, instituting cuts in health, education and social welfare services;
The privatisation of state-run industries, often resulting in large-scale lay-offs and the loss of services to remote or poor areas;
Currency devaluation and export promotion, leading to the soaring cost of imports, land use changed for cash crops, and reliance on international commodity markets; Raising interest rates to tackle inflation, which often has the effect of putting small companies out of business; The removal of price controls, leading to rapid price rises for basic goods and services.
Faced with severe balance of payments problems, indebted countries have few choices -they are either obliged to implement IMF policies, even when they are ill-suited to their economic and social circumstances, or risk economic isolation. Most governments are prepared to sacrifice their economic sovereignty rather than face isolation and economic sanctions. As a consequence, the IMF in its role as lender of last resort' finds itself managing the economies of a growing number of countries around the world. It currently dictates the macroeconomic policies of some eighty developing In the majority of LDCs, levels of debt continue to be unsustainable, despite prolonged exposure to IMF-imposed economic reforms. The HIPC initiative introduced by the World Bank and IMF to deal with unsustainable debt has so far provided little, if any, genuine debt relief. Acceptance for debt relief, under the HIPC initiative, has proved onerous and has generated concerted criticisms from NGOs and some of the more enlightened donor countries for radical reform of the HIPC initiative to ensure a genuine commitment to debt relief that is compatible with international targets for poverty reduction. So far, however, the reforms suggested by the G7 at its Cologne meeting that propose to develop mechanisms for strengthening the linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction are at best weakly integrated into strategies for achieving the internationally agreed human development goals set for 2015. If the linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction is to be strengthened, ESAF must be integrated into a broader, longer-term strategy for human development. With regard to eligibility for HIPC, debt relief should be provided at the earliest possible stage to governments demonstratingthrough a Debt-for-Development plan -a capacity to absorb savings into national poverty reduction strategies (UNICEF/Oxfam 2000).
Poverty, Instability and Conflict
Globalisation, far from being benign, is now widely recognised to have a dichotomous nature, which simultaneously, includes and excludes, integrates and fragments the global community (Rogers 2000; Kofman and Youngs 1996; Cox and Sinclair 1996) . While certain states and their economies have been strengthened via the process of economic integration, many states in the periphery -exposed to the twin forces of globalisation, namely the ITC revolution and market liberalisation -have been weakened and marginalised. Weakened states, stripped of their sovereignty in economic affairs, are no longer able to operate in their national interest (Cerney 1996; Strange 1996) . In a growing number of cases the state has been so undermined that its ability to provide basic public goods such as welfare and security to its citizens has been all but nullified.
When governments fail to provide social welfare, health, education and security to their citizens they lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. The IMP and World Bank tend to distance themselves completely from their failed programmes, blaming inadequate political will or corrupt governance. Of course it would be improper to overlook the role that irresponsible and corrupt governments have played in the impoverishment and mismanagement of their economies. But it is equally inappropriate to overlook the role that external agencies have played in exacerbating poverty, tensions and conflict in these vulnerable and weak economies.
Conflict theorists have for some time been at pains to point out that poverty, the unequal distribution of wealth and the failure to meet basic human needs constitute a source of structural violence that lies at the heart of many conflicts (Azar 1990; Rogers 2000; Suhrke 1999; Tansey et al. 1993) . Nowhere is this more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa, where the spiral of poverty, indebtedness and conflict is most visible. An examination of the development statistics of sub-Saharan countries engaged in conflict, or recently emerged from conflict, reveals a startling pattern of low per capita income, low life expectancy, low levels of FOI, low levels of overseas development assistance (ODA) and high levels of indebtedness (see Table 1 ).
It can be argued that the statistics in Table 1 reveal the effects of conflict on development, but for many of these countries economic collapse preceded the outbreak of violence. Moreover, most of these countries have been subjected to prolonged periods of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes which have done little to stimulate growth but much to intensify social tensions and unrest.
Globalisation and the New Forms of Conflict
The simultaneous rise in debt, loss of economic sovereignty, weakening of the state, unequal terms of trade and growing levels of poverty have resulted in the emergence of what the French writer Alain Mine call les zones grises -grey areas (Mmc 1993 ). These are regions in which state legitimacy and the rule of law have all but broken down. They are on the increase especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union. In these regions, authority is increasingly divided between what is left of formal institutions, local warlords and gang or Of the thirty major conflicts recorded around the world in 2000, twenty-three are inter-societal, and many of the latter are protracted. Por instance, the wars in Angola and Columbia have been going on since 1963 and 1961 respectively Over time, protracted conflicts exact a huge cost in human life and resources (see Table 2 for details). In total, the twenty-three conflicts listed have resulted in over four million deaths and have cost the countries a total of 138 billion dollars (1995 prices). These figures must be treated with caution, however, as statistics from conflict-prone developing countries are notoriously unreliable. Nevertheless, they do provide some kind of indicator of the immense socio-economic costs that conflict exacts and give some kind of scale to the human tragedy that this form of conflict generates. Wars and violence in developing countries have been variously characterised by liberals as conflicts between 'erratic primitives of shifting allegiances, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order' (Peters 1994) , or conflict is seen to be motivated by 'fanatical, ideologically based loyalties ' (van Creveld 1991) . Conflict thus perceived is depicted as irrational and dysfunctional, as it interrupts the benevolent processes of economic development and democratisation promoted by civilised powers in the North. In accordance with this view, conflict resolution takes place when the various parties are persuaded to see reason, to recognise the plus-sum advantages of peace for all, and when the state is reconstituted and the status quo ante is resurrected. Keen, for instance, challenges the common assumption that war is a contest between two sides, each trying to triumph over the other. Rather, he argues, war has become an alternative system of profit, power and protection, in which adversaries Collier argues that the majority of wars are driven by the economic motive of greed rather than by grievance (Collier 2000) . This somewhat determinist argument has been contested by analysts such as Ero ( 2001) commonly done, is misleading, as the very phrase presupposes there is a 'state' over which, and inside which, combatants are fighting. Duffield (1998) prefers to refer to these types of conflict as 'postmodern', a phrase which takes account of 'the emergence of long-term political and economic projects that no longer need to anchor political authority in conventional territorial, bureaucratic or consent-based structures.
For many actors in conflict, war makes rational economic sense, not only because it enhances their local status and wealth, but also because it is rooted in the power relations in the global status quo ante. become a means to accumulate wealth and a guarantor of personal security Berdal (1996: 17) has noted that, in such a context, 'weapons always have an economic as well as a security value'. The widespread resort to arms can thus be viewed as a Darwinian form of survival through the use of force in situations where formal guarantees of economic and physical security have broken down.
Collectively, these observations help to explain the durability of violence and conflict in the periphery, and the general resistance that they have to the international community's attempts at conflict resolution and international peace-brokeririg (Berdal and Malone 2000) . Far from being the irrational responses of primitives, these 'postmodern' forms of conflict are highly rational in a situation of economic scarcity and exclusion (Duffield 2000) . But more than this, these forms of conflict are a product and a process of the evolving global order, not an aberration as is often assumed in liberal discourse.
Security and Sustainable Development
The traditional discourse on security and development is found wanting in a world where familiar boundaries, structures of authority and identity are breaking down.
For far too long the concept of security has been tied to the idea of territorial security, the protection of national interests in foreign policy (or the idea of global security free from the threat of a nuclear holocaust). These concepts have overlooked the fact that for many millions of people the greatest threats to their security come from disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. In recognition of this hiatus, there has been a shift in the referent point of security from one that lays stress on territoriality and sovereignty, to one that emphasises human security
Human security is here understood as 'freedom from fear and freedom from threat', and is concerned with economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security These elements form an interdependent whole. When the human security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, other nations are often drawn in. The problems of famine, disease, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration know no borders. Their consequences traverse the globe. Thus the provision of guarantees for human security to those most threatened in their daily lives ensures greater global security The challenge o! transforming an environment that marginalises and impoverishes people with one that provides sustainable livelihoods is a starting point for guaranteeing human security for all. The emphasis placed on sustainable development rather than on more orthodox economic growth strategies derives from a realisation that policies of development based on material enrichment, as measured by gross national product (GNP) per capita, have not necessarily improved the conditions of the vast majority of the populations of the developing countries of the world. In fact, despite growth in GNu poverty and deprivation has been on the increase and with it a growing incidence of human insecurity and violence.
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The paradigm of sustainable human development values human life for itself. It does not value life simply because people can produce or consume material goods. Nor does it value one person life over another (UNDP 1994) . In this paradigm, no human being ought to be condemned to a short life just because they are born in a certain region or country are a certain race or sex. Development should allow individuals the choice to explore their human potential to the full and to put their capabilities to best use. The universal right to life is the link between the needs of human development in the present and those of the future -especially the needs for environmental preservation and The universal right to life is also the common thread which binds the notion of sustainable human development to that of human security The fear or the reality of want and of physical threat are the major factors that contribute to the insecurity for the poor and marginalised in the developing world.
In the sense in which sustainable human development provides an ethical and normative framework conforming with certain fundamental universal moral values about the right to life and freedom of choice, it can also be viewed as a tool for conflict prevention and local and regional security The recognition of the need to manage economic reforms in such a way as to enhance, rather than undermine, political stability has been forced rather reluctantly on the agendas of the Washington institutions by the experience of the East Asian crisis. lt has opened the way to an acknowledgement that governments must be fully involved in defining the reform process and that programmes must not be imposed formulaically, but instead tailored to each country particular political and economic circumstances. Eut if economic inequality is to be challenged effectively as a source of structural violence, the international institutions need to do far more than simply tinker with reforms. There needs to be a fundamental transformation of the ideological foundatioñs upon which these institutions legitimise themselves. Global security will not be enhanced until such time as the existing economic orthodoxy is challenged and replaced.
Conclusion
The neoliberal view of globalisation as a benign process encouraging peace and development lives on as the dominant doctrine of the multilateral organisations. Yet the protracted failure of IMF-and World Bank-imposed reforms to deliver the most basic of human needs to over 20 per cent of the global population, is a testimony to their failure as a model of both development and stability Rather, neoliberal policies constitute a form of structural violence that places the greed of the few above the basic human security of the many Increasingly, demands are being made for a reform of the current patterns of globalisation to redress its destabilising effects (DFID 2000; Hellenier 1999; UNDP 1999) . Kofi Annan (2000) , in his Millenium Assembly speech, observed that the best way to prevent conflict is to promote healthy and balanced economic development, combined with human rights, minority rights and political arrangements in which all groups are fairly represented. To achieve this will require the adoption of a different model of development to that which currently dominates the multilateral agenda.
Attempts to articulate an alternative value system for the global economy are to be found in the 'Alternative Declaration' produced by the NGO Forum at the Copenhagen Summit. It lays stress on equity participation, self-reliance and sustainability.
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The 'Alternative Declaration' 'rejects the economic liberalism accepted by the governments of the North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation rather than the alleviation of the global social crisis.
Moreover, it identifies trade liberalisation and privatisation as the cause of the growing concentration of wealth globally' (Thomas 1998: 459) . Its alternative conception of development values diversity above universality, and is based on a different conception of rights than that which is articulated by the 'Washington Consensus'. It poses a challenge to the economic orthodoxy and existing global structures of power, and intrinsically establishes a relationship between globalisation and the rising insecurity in the developing world. In the absence of a doctrinal change that concretely deals with the suffering and marginalisation caused by the inequities of the global system, the spectre of disorder, instability, crime and violence will only grow. These are, after all, the rational responses to the survival of the fittest in a global system that puts profit before people's basic needs. Note 1. The criteria defining an LDC include low income as measured by GDP per capita, weak human resources as measured by a composite index based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie intake, combined primaly and secondary enrolment and adult literacy, low levels of economic diversification, as measured by a composite index based on share of manufacturing in GDP, share of labour force in industry, annual per capita commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD export concentration index.
